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Karla Homolka  
Aim of the paper 
This paper is based upon the case of Karla Homolka. I have provided you with 
handouts which outline the main details of Karla’s life. Karla’s case is problematic. 
As you can see from the handout Karla was both a victim and a perpetrator of sexual 
violence. Despite her seemingly active participation in sexual violence, her agency 
and her legal culpability remain contested issues. Many have attempted to answer the 
overarching question: was she a coerced/compliant victim or a culpable perpetrator? 
This paper will attempt to resolve the tension between her non-agency and her legal 
responsibility by drawing upon Primo Levi’s (1988) concept of ‘gray zones’.  
Context  
Just to give you a bit of background/context. This paper is a response to a suggestion 
made by Murphy and Whitty who - in the 2006 edition of Feminist Legal Studies - 
called for more complex accounts of female victims’ role in oppressing other victims. 
Specifically, they suggest applying the concept of ‘gray zones’ to the case of Karla 
Homolka. As we now, gray zones is a term developed by Primo Levi (1988) to 
describe the circumstances within Nazi concentration camps when prisoners assumed 
the role of perpetrator. They decided, having themselves suffered under conditions of 
extreme oppression, to subjugate their fellow victims. This takes place under 
ambiguous circumstances, therefore making judgement and punishment difficult. 
Claudia Card (2000, 2002) extends the terminology to talk about ‘gray areas’. She 
analyses women’s involvement in oppressing fellow female victims within the context 




Binary constructions  
The two ‘stories’ used in the Karla Homolka case alternate between: 
a) a passive innocent dupe - a woman in danger  
b)a  morally depraved dangerous woman  
According to Morrissey (2003) and Pearson (1998) Karla should be regarded as a 
willing and active participant in the rape and murder of young girls - ‘bad woman’. 
Within this reading of the case, Karla is regarded as a cold and unsympathetic woman 
who acted agentically. This portrayal was substantiated by the recovery of the 
videotapes of the sexual assaults, shown in the courtroom, which depicted Karla’s 
involvement in the sexual attacks on the young girls. Additional proof of Karla’s 
callous nature was found in her lack of empathy for the young victims. Despite being 
left alone on two separate occasions with Kirsten French during the three days she 
was held captive, Karla did not make any attempt to help free her.  
 
The other reading of the case is to view Karla as a woman in danger (Kilty and Frigon 
2007) - a masochistic victim. Indeed, throughout their relationship, Karla was a victim 
of Paul’s violence and emotional abuse. Karla’s agency and her legal culpability are 
called into question when her own victimisation - of physical, emotional and sexual 
abuse at the hands of her husband - is taken into account (Kilty and Frigon 2007). Her 
involvement in the crimes was far from voluntary: her participation was simply a 
means of survival. Within this reading of the case, Karla is portrayed as a ‘victim’ of 








The dichotomous construction of violent women is not uncommon. Indeed, there has 
been a tendency, within analyses of women’s violence, to adopt an either/or binary 
approach. This sees violent women as either absolved of any responsibility for their 
violent actions through ‘stories’ which depict them as innocent. Or, they are vilified 
for such actions and regarded as ‘bad’ (Peter 2006). This polarized view of violent 
women - as either victims who fight back (thus making their actions legally 
justifiable) or culpable perpetrators (thus rendering them legally responsible) - is 



















We all know that in the past feminists have avoided the subject of women’s violence 
or have been very selective with the cases they choose to discuss (Morrissey 2003). 
Commentators have observed that “...something of a veil tends to be drawn over those 
more uncomfortable cases where the victim is a child or another woman...”(Allen 
1987, p.93). By now we are all familiar with the reason for this silence/avoidance: 
feminists have been preoccupied with violence against women (Graycar and Morgan 
2002; Mackinnon, 1997). Also, some feminists remain uncomfortable acknowledging 
women’s sexual agency, for fear it might overshadow or, worse still, excuse men’s 
sexual violence against women (see Howe 2008).  
 
However, not all feminist share this position. Various feminists have commented on 
the deleterious effect of the ‘woman-as-victim’ maxim (Allen 1987; Daly 1994 
Harding 1987) and have moved beyond this reductionist process towards an 
appreciation that women can be both a victim and a perpetrator (Ajzenstadt 2009; 
Dunn, and Powell-Williams 2007; Peter 2006; Sjoberg 2008). This work has been 
used most notably in discussions of battered women who kill their husbands. Within 
this context the women can be regarding as avenging victims as they kill the 
perpetrators. The problem with Karla Homolka is that she killed other innocent 
women. She did not kill her persecutor instead she persecuted other innocent female 
victims. In order to address this agency/structure debate I will now turn to Levi’s 







Gray Zones  
Victims become complicit in oppressing/victimizing other victims. Coercion, 
compliance, survival. Card (2000) believes that gray zones have three striking 
features:  
 
First, their inhabitants are victims of evil. Second, these inhabitants are 
implicated through their choices in perpetrating some of the same or 
similar evils on others who are already victims like themselves. And 
third, gray-zone inhabitants act under extraordinary stress (Card 2000, 
p.517). 
Levi – Nazi concentration camps. Prisoners compelled to victimize oppress their 














Women Misogyny and Gray Areas  
Drawing upon Levi’s (1988) notion of gray zones; Claudia Card (2000) analyses 
women’s involvement in gray areas within the ‘social context of misogyny’. 
Misogyny within this context refers to practices, behaviours, and socially created 
environments that are hostile to women and girls (Card 2000, p.513).  
Women’s participation, according to Card (2000), is not always voluntary.  Rather, it 
is often the result of oppressive and coercive situations with men - both on a structural 
and individual level. The ambiguity of these gray areas is implied not only because 
the individual is both a victim and an agent, but because of the ‘extraordinary moral 
stress’ they are under. This makes judging their guilt and responsibility problematic 















Gray areas  
This ‘grayness’ according to Card has multiple sources. Firstly, there is the blurring of 
boundaries between evil and innocence. There are victims who have clearly suffered 
at the hands of their persecutors who, at this point, are regarded as passive/innocent. 
Yet, these “victims’ inflict harm and suffering onto others, who also did not deserve 
to suffer. Yet given the circumstances or context, their behaviour is not judged or 
understood as comparable to that of their persecutors. This is because “…gray agents 


















So who and what actions fall within gray zones? 
Card argues that it is important to distinguish between those women who face morally 
ambiguous circumstances, in which the choices available to them are complex and 
those who do not. (Card 2000). Gray choices, Card (2000) argues, should not include 
the choices facing all individuals who are both victims and perpetrators of evil for e.g. 
survivors of torture who seek revenge. This behaviour, as Card understands it, is not 
ambiguous nor is it “morally difficult or complex” (Card 2000, p.524).  
 
 
Nor is the behaviour of battered women who kill. Yes they might be “deeply 
perplexing” because they are viewed as both victims and perpetrators. Yet they are 
not gray agents according to Card (2000). Their violence is not directed towards other 
victims of oppression. The target of their violence is their oppressors. Their behaviour 
“does not give us a gray zone in which the agent victimizes someone who, like 
herself, is already a victim or already a target of oppression”. In a similar vein to Levi 
(1988), Card (2000 2002) understands gray zones to consist of victim-perpetrators 










Gray Areas: A Recuperative Narrative? 
So how can the concept of gray zones or areas assist us in recuperating the narrative 
of Karla Homolka? Let’s go back to Card’s argument about grayness.  
‘Grayness’, according to Card’s (2000) thesis, is based upon the blurring of 
boundaries between oppression and culpable wrongdoing. In the first instance there 
are victims (Karla) who have suffered at the hands of their oppressors (Paul Bernado). 
At this point the victims can be regarded as passive/blameless. However, these 
‘victims’ then go on to subjugate other undeserving victims (Tammy, Jane Doe, 
Leslie Mahaffy and Kirsten French). These victim-perpetrators are not to be judged as 
harshly as their persecutors, as they have acted under conditions of extreme duress. 
The first two notions resemble Karla’s situation: she was a victim who then 
victimized other female sufferers. The issue of diminished responsibility is, however, 















Choice and obligation  
To this end I will draw upon the work of Nancy Hirschmann. 
Obligation is based upon voluntarist principles (Hirschmann, 1989). However, 
Hirschmann draws attention to the problems associated with voluntarist conceptions 
of obligation. One of which is the gender bias inherent within obligation theory.  This 
means ‘...cultural biases against women, which deny women opportunities for consent 
and pervert consent theory as a result’ (Hirschmann 1989:1229). Under this line of 
thinking obligation represents the limitations which can be placed upon an 
individuals’ behaviour. In Hirschmann’s words: ‘...obligation is a limitation on 
behaviour, a requirement for action or nonaction, that the actor or nonactor has chosen 
or agreed to’ (Hirschmann, 1989:1227). 
Hirschmann (1989) reminds us that historically women have been bound to a series of 
obligations. She further argues that women have been denied opportunities to choose 
and create their own lives. ‘Obligation needs to be reformulated to account for...the 
very human experience of choicelessness, and for the fact that...choice exists in 











Choice and obligation  
On this subject of choice and free agency Hirschman (1998, p.361 emphasis in the 
original) states: “the act of choosing is necessary but not sufficient. What is also 
needed is the ability to formulate choices, and this requires the ability to have 
meaningful power in the construction of contexts”. The choice for Karla, according to 
her testimony, was this: assist with the sexual assaults and the murders in order to 
protect her own life or, by trying to protect the girls, risk being killed. Karla chose the 
former. Yet, if we follow Hirschman’s thinking we are to believe that Karla did not 
have any ‘meaningful power in the construction’ of the situation she found herself in. 
In other words, she was not responsible for formulating the choices available to her in 
the first place – she was under the control and conditions of Paul Bernado. He was in 















Coercion and relational autonomy  
For Hirschmann then obligation and social contract theory are based upon a 
relationship of power and domination not simply one of voluntary consent 
(Hirschmann, 1989). So this brings us to the issue of coercion – victims have been 
forced to participate. However Chapman argues that ‘...the accused who seeks to use 
the established and recognized defence of duress must show that they were not 
complicit in bringing the coercion upon themselves’ (Chapman, 2008, p.15). 
 
Perhaps the question that needs to be resolved, however, is whether escape - as 
opposed to avoidance - from oppression is an option for these victim-perpetrators? 
This was certainly the focus of Levi’s (1988) analysis: the structure of state 
oppression experienced by the prisoners offered them no opportunity or avenue for 












Coercion and relational autonomy 
We must adopt a feminist analysis, one which suggests that the choices and options 
available to women, living in a male dominated society, are constrained, thus 
impacting upon their autonomy (Ajzenstadt 2009; Sjoberg 2008; Wesely 2006). This 
means adopting a relational autonomy approach (Sjoberg 2008).  
This approach accepts that individuals make choices, but is also recognises that 
choice is not something which is given completely freely. Says Sjoberg (2007:98) 
‘...relational autonomy is the recognition that freedom of action is defined and limited 
by political and social relationships. Relational autonomy does not reject the idea of 
individual choice, but realizes that choice is not absolute in a world of power 
disparity’.  
 
Should individuals be held accountable for the actions they take within gray spaces? 
In other words, what constraints are placed upon them within these morally gray 
spaces? Is complicity their only option?   
 
Going back to Hirschman’s (1998) ideas about choice and autonomy, perhaps we 
need to place Karla’s actions within a social structural and historical context of gender 
inequality and power imbalances within heterosexual relationships. Karla’s 
involvement in the crimes is an example of the strategic ways women negotiate their 







Within the context of a patriarchal social structure battered women often lack the 
resources to just walk away. Not only does this resonate with Card’s claim that gray 
agents lack the freedom to leave the situation. Levi (1988, p.41) also said that gray 
zones are characterized by regimes of ‘terror and obsequiousness’ and the harsher the 
subjugation the more likely the victim is to collaborate with the authority. This line of 
thinking may account for Karla’s later involvement in the crimes. During the final 
year of their relationship, for example, Paul’s violence towards Kara intensified.  
 
The difficulty with Card’s assertion that victim-oppressors lack the ability to walk 
away, when applied to the case of Karla Homolka, is that Karla did eventually leave.  
How is it that Karla managed to leave? Why did she not leave after the tragic death of 
her sister which occurred two years into their relationship? The use of the gray 
zone/area requires some degree of seeing the victim-perpetrators as unable to escape 















Karla’s testimony  
During her trial Karla testified to her involvement in the crimes but claimed to have 
been acting under extreme duress.  
 
Because I was told by Paul, and I knew from past experience that if I 
didn’t do what he told me to do I would get beaten and have to do it 
anyway. It wasn’t a case of saying “no” and just taking a beating, it 
was a case of saying “no” and being beaten until I did it (R. v. P. 



















Guilt and Responsibility  
Murphy and Whitty (2006) -  gray zones necessitate a consideration of different levels 
of responsibility. Levi’s (1988) - greatest blame lies with the persecutors. The guilt 
and accountability of the collaborators is harder to measure. Karla admitted to her 
involvement in the sexual assaults and the murders. However, despite admitting to her 
involvement in the crimes, Karla presented herself as a masochistic victim who had 
been forced to participate and was therefore not as legally responsible as Paul. This is 
illustrated in the following interview excerpt: 
 
Does the acknowledgement of her coercion and victimisation render her blameless? 
Levi (1988) argues that the behaviour of the collaborators within the gray zone is not 
to be measured against the behaviour of the persecutors. This is because these 
victimised agents have acted under conditions of ‘extraordinary stress’. However, was 
Karla under extraordinary stress when she committed the sexual assault on her sister 
back in 1990 which occurred at the beginning of her relationship with Paul?  
If we are to successfully apply the concept of gray zones to this case we have to 










Concluding Comments  
The use of gray zones in the case of Karla Homolka offers partial recuperation. I do 
not feel that it accounts for her involvement in the sexual assault of her sister. By 
taking into account Karla’s ‘grayness’ her culpability and her agency for her crimes 
are not being revoked. Rather, they are mitigated by her victimisation and her 
coercion. This case illustrates the difficulty in trying to attribute violent women with 
complete responsibility for their actions or conversely, absolving them of any 
accountability (see Peter 2006). By utilizing the concept of gray zones, we are able to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of the complicated relationship between 
victimisation and agency.  
 
Feminists have devoted time and effort into highlighting women’s victimisation and 
oppression by men. Women like Karla are problematic because they are both victims 
and agents. It is not completely apparent, particularly in this case, where coercion 
ends and agency begins. As Card argues: “[w]omen, who have inhabited many gray 
zones, present challenges for feminist theorists, who have long struggled with how 
resistance is possible under coercive institutions” (Card 2000, p.509). 
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